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Abstract
Background: The direction of health service policy in England is for more diversification in the design,
commissioning and provision of health care services. The case study which is the subject of this paper was
selected specifically because of the partnering with a private sector organisation to manage whole system redesign
of primary care and to support the commissioning of services for people with long term conditions at risk of
unplanned hospital admissions and associated service provision activities. The case study forms part of a larger
Department of Health funded project on the practice of commissioning which aims to find the best means of
achieving a balance between monitoring and control on the one hand, and flexibility and innovation on the other,
and to find out what modes of commissioning are most effective in different circumstances and for different
services.
Methods: A single case study method was adopted to explore multiple perspectives of the complexities and
uniqueness of a public-private partnership referred to as the “Livewell project”. 10 single depth interviews were
carried out with key informants across the GP practices, the PCT and the private provider involved in the initiative.
Results: The main themes arising from single depth interviews with the case study participants include a particular
understanding about the concept of commissioning in the context of primary care, ambitions for primary care
redesign, the importance of key roles and strong relationships, issues around the adoption and spread of
innovation, and the impact of the current changes to commissioning arrangements. The findings identified a close
and high trust relationship between GPs (the commissioners) and the private commissioning support and provider
firm. The antecedents to the contract for the project being signed indicated the importance of leveraging external
contacts and influence (resource dependency theory).
Conclusions: The study has surfaced issues around innovation adoption in the healthcare context. The case
identifies ‘negotiated order’, managerial performance of providers and disciplinary control as three media of power
used in combination by commissioners. The case lends support for stewardship and resource dependency
governance theories as explanations of the underpinning conditions for effective commissioning in certain
circumstances within a quasi marketised healthcare system.
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Background
The direction of health service policy in England is for
more diversification in health care services provided by
newly configured NHS services, voluntary, local govern-
ment and corporate sector organisations; and for greater
diversity in commissioning organisations. The NHS will
be required to ensure that effective, efficient, patient-
centred and safe services are commissioned but without
stifling flexibility and innovation [1,2]. Public-private
partnerships (PPPs) are being encouraged. These take
many forms, including outsourcing, public finance initia-
tives (PFI) and strategic partnering, but essentially arise
from make or buy decisions that governments face to
deliver societal goals. The relationships between state
and private actors is argued as having resulted in the
phenomenon of hybridity in which the players develop
both public and private orientations and interests [3]. In
contrast with the US and some parts of Europe, PPPs
are a relatively new phenomenon in the UK. Outside
the health sector, there has been a drive to view com-
missioning and procurement away from a merely pur-
chasing activity focussing on price and time-to-market,
towards a more strategic process, which comprises find-
ing, developing and leveraging external resources to
help achieve the goals of the firm [4,5]. An important
question is how to find the best strategic means of
achieving a balance between control and flexibility, and
to find out what modes of commissioning are most
effective in different circumstances and for different
services.
We use two main theoretical frames in order to
understand the processes of effective healthcare com-
missioning. The first focuses on the use of power, and
the second focuses on corporate governance practices
for setting direction and exerting control.
The first theoretical framework that underpins this
case study and the main associated study on the practice
of commissioning is a contingency theory of modes of
commissioning [6]. This theory explores how commis-
sioning practice interacts with co-existing hierarchical
and networked governance [7,8]. Governance is an exer-
cise of power. Therborn’s conceptualisation of power
has been applied and adapted to healthcare commission-
ing to identify governance mechanisms that commis-
sioners may employ in the practice of commissioning
[9,10]. These governance mechanisms are conceptua-
lised as media of power. Six distinct media of power
that a commissioner may exercise in their relationships
with providers have been identified. These are: nego-
tiated order, provider competition, financial incentives,
ideological and disciplinary control, juridical governance
and managerial performance. Each medium of power is
described in the context of commissioner-provider rela-
tionships in Table 1.
Combinations of different media of power produce dis-
tinct “modes of commissioning”. The nature of such
modes is contingent upon the context within which deci-
sions are made, such as the speciality under review, geo-
graphy and the institutional features of the commissioning
organisation. Some media of power may reinforce each
Table 1 Six media of power exercised in commissioner-provider relationships
Media of power Description and sources
Medium 1 – Negotiated order (relationality) Conflicts are managed to produce a “negotiated order” [11]. The emphasis is on
relationality [12]. Negotiated order is characterised by explicit or tacit mutually agreed
arrangements between commissioners and providers about their involvement in and
responsibilities for commissioning. Such mutually agreed arrangement might relate to
information sharing and the division of labour, for example.
Medium 2 – Provider competition (contestability) This medium of power relates to commissioners’ attempts to manage competition
between providers [13]. Three key features of this include the criteria for selecting
providers, the range of providers and monopsonisation - buyer-side monopoly [14]
Medium 3 – Financial incentives Commissioners may employ a number of financial incentives to influence provider
behaviours. These may relate to units of payment [15], timing of payment, terms and
conditions, bonuses, penalties and exemptions [16].
Medium 4 – Ideological and disciplinary control
(professional and political ideologies)
Ideological and disciplinary controls through discursive “orders” may be employed by
commissioners in their negotiations [17-19]. For example these might relate to technical
or scientific knowledge (such as evidence based practice), occupational ethos and norms
of conduct, political and economic belief-systems and appeals to higher managerial and
political authority such as “targets”, regulators or managerial elite.
Medium 5 – Juridical governance (contracts and law) Legal and regulatory mechanisms may be used by commissioners in various ways [20].
This medium of power might refer to contract specifications, the use or threat of coercive
enforcement of contracts or legal rights and the use of arbitration.
Medium 6 – Managerial performance of commissioning
(managerial performance repertoires)
Commissioners have a range of managerial mechanisms and resources to draw on when
negotiating with providers [21]. These include decisions about which stakeholders are
involved, the role of external supporting bodies, scrutiny of provider performance,
prevailing models of commissioning and delegation of commissioning roles and
responsibilities.
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other whilst others may conflict (elements of juridical con-
trol and negotiated order for example). This is consistent
with Osborne and Brown’s [22] view that inherent contra-
dictions in the policy context (such as simultaneous cen-
tralisation and decentralisation) and different institutional
and temporal contexts means that various forces play out
in different ways. By combining different media of power
to identify specific modes of commissioning the theoretical
framework developed here offers a means of both recog-
nising and reconciling any inherent contradictions in the
relationship between commissioners and providers, in the
context where they are created and sustained.
This framework is outlined in more detail in a parallel
article in this edition of BMC HSR, drawing from mate-
rial collected in the same Department of Health funded
research study on the practice of commissioning, which
contrasts the dominant modes of commissioning used
in Germany with those found in England [6].
In examining the process of commissioning in this
case study, we also employ a second theoretical frame
drawing from a corporate governance perspective to
examine the conditions for effective commissioning gov-
ernance. Jensen and Meckling [23] emphasise the gener-
ality of the agency problem of stakeholders being able to
exert adequate control, both at all levels of management
and also across different types of organisations, includ-
ing non-profit organisations, government corporations
and cooperatives in corporate and contract governance.
Also taking an agency view, Berle and Means argue that
problems of exerting adequate control exist as a result
of different or opposing sets of interests between man-
agers and shareholders, public administrators and tax-
payers, and, in healthcare, between commissioners and
providers [24]. Stewardship theory and resource depen-
dency theory propose different explanations based,
respectively, on assumptions around a joint endeavour
between the parties in a united view around securing
better outcomes, and the need for boundary spanning to
secure investment and enhanced reputation [25,26].
Stakeholder governance is concerned with the creation
of long term public value and an organisation purpose
which satisfices a wider community interest. With the
exception of agency theory, these theories also resonate
with the negotiated order as a medium of power
described above, and also with the use of PPPs for stra-
tegic partnering purposes. Each main corporate govern-
ance theory and associated governance practices is
outlined in Table 2.
Our research questions therefore relate to these two
theoretical frames: which media of power outlined
above are combined to enact modes of healthcare com-
missioning, and to what effect, and which corporate
governance theories have most utility in understanding
the underpinning practices of healthcare commissioning.
Methods
To answer these questions, the Livewell (not its real
name) project was chosen. Yin outlined the potential for
analytic generalisation from the use of case study metho-
dology, for example that one or more cases are typical of
other situations or examples, and thus lead the way to
theory building [30]. Taking a somewhat different episte-
mological stance, the single case study approach is advo-
cated by Simons [31,32] as a way of getting beneath the
surface of policy implementation, helping to challenge
accepted thinking and current forms of knowing and to
reconstruct understanding. Case study explores multiple
perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a pro-
ject or programme in a ‘real life’ context [31][p21]. The
argument runs that this alternative way of seeing by
Table 2 Conjunction of main corporate governance theories and practices
THEORIES PRACTICE
FOCUS DYNAMICS
Agency:
Control of management; managers and owners/stakeholders have
different interests; [23,24]
Supervision of management
Risk minimisation & compliance
Monitoring of performance against targets
and objectives
High challenge
Controlling
Critical style in order to
achieve goals
Stewardship:
Joint endeavour with management; managers and owners/stakeholders
have same interests [25]
Strategic thinking
Emphasis on improvements & excellence in
performance & use of resources
Appreciative style to
achieve goals
Collaborative
Resource Dependency:
Leveraging of external expertise and influence as organisation success
dependent upon fit with external environment [26]
Policy formulation
Horizon scanning
Inward investment of resource and reputation
Predominantly external
orientation
Management through
influence
Stakeholder:
Mirroring community and society served to ensure that organisation
serves its mission and purpose [28,29]
Supervision of management
Monitoring of performance against targets
and objectives
Creation of long term public value
System/ society
focussed orientation
Consensual
Mindful of sectional or
political interests
(Source: [27])
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focussing on the uniqueness of the case produces uncer-
tainty, disruption and new insights. And the paradox of
case study is that ‘...by studying the uniqueness of the par-
ticular, we come to understand the universal...’ [31][
p231]. Taking this a step further, it can be argued that in
studying the individual case, unique insights also arise
from the perspectives of each participant who are part of
the case, all of whom are the street level bureaucrats [33]
making their own sense of government policy as they
implement it. Greenhalgh and colleagues argue that the
rich description made possible by in-depth case study is
the key to understanding the dynamic complexities in
social life and particularly in healthcare; further they sug-
gest that the study of ‘language games’ (i.e. contextualised
talk and action) of multiple stakeholders offer important
insights leading to heuristic generalisation (i.e. what is
really going on here?) [34].
Policy related to healthcare commissioning is in a state
of flux, transition and uncertainty. Coupling this with the
highly contextualised nature of the topic, and the political,
social, economic and professional complexity of the sys-
tem that it resides within (see also Allen [35] and Porter et
al [36] in this special issue); a case study approach appears
especially valuable. The elicitation of unique features and
the study of language games which are central to Simons
and Greenhalgh’s perspectives appear to us to be particu-
larly germane in tackling questions of the actual use of
power and control and the choices made in the mechan-
isms of governance deployed in the practice of commis-
sioning of health care.
Livewell is a single in-depth case study of a public-
private partnership. It was selected as a stand-alone
mini case study site because of government policy to
encourage private sector involvement in commissioning.
In this instance, it involves the partnering with a private
sector organisation, as co-commissioner and provider, to
aid whole system redesign in primary care and to sup-
port the commissioning of services for people with long
term conditions at risk of unplanned hospital admis-
sions. It can be characterised as a strategic partnering
form of public private partnership longer term colla-
boration, in contrast with other forms identified by Skel-
cher such as PFI, contracting out, franchising, and joint
venture [3]). The programme is described in more detail
in Additional file 1.
10 single depth interviews, audio recorded and tran-
scribed, were carried out with key informants involved
in the practices in the commissioning and management
of the Livewell initiative and with the private partner
lead. The interviewees were selected on the basis of the
widest possible range of professional backgrounds and
roles in the initiative. The topics covered in the inter-
views are outlined in Additional file 2. These were
worked up to elicit the media of power and corporate
governance practices in use in commissioning in this
case. The identity of our informants was kept confiden-
tial and findings are reported anonymously. Informants
were consulted as to whether they would like copy of
the transcript of their interviews. This offer was taken
up by one: there was no revision suggested to the tran-
script as a result. One other respondent was keen to
have his/her job title more precisely recorded in the
report and in publications. Documentary evidence was
also gathered from key documents and evaluations (for
example the evaluation of phase 1 of the programme;
patient information sheets) and the researcher also
attended programme management meetings. The project
has ethical approval from the NHS Research Ethics
committee for the South West of England. Governance
arrangements of the project are organised by the Penin-
sula Clinical Research Network.
The case study was analysed using a common analytic
framework including fields reflecting the media of
power and the governance practices described above. To
check whether the framework omitted important data
patterns, we also inductively coded the qualitative data
to add new themes to the analytic framework [37]. The
findings were developed using a thematic analysis and a
grounded theory approach [38], as well as a coding fra-
mework based on the six media of power and corporate
governance theories. The main themes that we identified
and outlined in the findings were: the participants’
understanding and use of the term ‘commissioning’; chal-
lenges in primary care; ambitions for the project; roles
and relationships; impact, adoption and spread of innova-
tion; and impact of changes in commissioning arrange-
ments. In the discussion section, we then proceed to
highlight the dominant media of power deployed, and the
main corporate governance practices in use in this case
study, before drawing further provisional conclusions for
theory and practice.
Results
Interviewees came from four of the five practices and
include 4 GPs [GP1, GP2, GP3, GP4], 2 advanced nurse
practitioners [ANP1, ANP2] 1 practice manager [PM], 1
business manager [BM], the private provider lead [PPL]
and a Primary Care Trust chief executive [CE]. To pre-
serve anonymity, the job titles have in some cases been
slightly altered to more generic roles.
Understanding and use of the term ‘commissioning’
Not surprisingly, given the full title of the Livewell pro-
gramme which includes the term ‘service redesign’, respon-
dents did not particularly like the term ‘commissioning’:
‘.....We wouldn’t use the word commissioning at all.
And, actually, we think it’s over-laboured in the UK. Far
too much time and attention is given to commissioning
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and far too little time and attention is given to services....
we really want to see a sea change. We want to demon-
strate what services look like when they’re good.’ [BM].
The term ‘service redesign’ was preferred by all
respondents, apart from the PCT chief executive. This
redesign project was developed, designed, and signed off
by patients, carers, care givers, and other stakeholders.
One respondent asserted that the term commissioning
contains an inherent assumption that there is certainty
about what is required, although in reality there may
not be certainty or good evidence about what will work.
The second point made was about the use of inte-
grated care as an organising principle. This was illu-
strated by thinking on services improvement in the
programme around a fictional woman called ‘Maisie’
who is a carer for her mother who has dementia and
who has her own health problems. Third, there was sup-
port for the notion that effective commissioning delivers
better quality for a lower cost. Fourth, there was empha-
sis on effective ‘hands on’ micro-commissioning (the
doing of service redesign) at the frontline, including the
use of analytics, financial modelling, and making use of
the experiences of users and care-givers. Finally there
was a warning about the need not to underestimate the
length of time required to achieve change and the emo-
tional labour of the commissioning work:
‘....It [commissioning] will make a difference provided
everybody has got a lot of time, the clinician sitting there
has got a lot of time to do all the job. Even if you under-
stand what needs to be done, to change the system it takes
a very, very long time. Sometimes the secondary care they
work in their own way, they may not agree with you and
sometimes even if they agree with you, to change them it
takes many years and sometimes (dividing the pot) that
causes a lot of problems....’. [GP3]
Challenges and choices in primary care
Respondents described significant problems in motivat-
ing patients to choose healthier life styles and to look
after themselves better in such a deprived area, where
the patients have so many other economic and social
problems to contend with. They also reported pressure
by patients for referral to specialists in a search for med-
ical solutions, and other struggles to contain care out-
side hospital. The reality of the practice of primary care
was exemplified by the comment below from a GP from
one practice:
‘......Why do we send to hospital? I’m not talking about
somebody with a really complicated history, I’m talking
demented lady, living at home, had a fall at home, when
you go [to their] home, no relatives, nobody to give them
medicine. They didn’t take their medicine for two days
so you ring the local social worker – no answer - and if
you look for a nurse, there’s hardly any community ser-
vice now. So at that time only one person will answer
your telephone call, that is the hospital. Nobody else,
that is the only hope for you, that the person goes to hos-
pital and then at least they’ll be better for that and
somebody will feed them, somebody will give them medi-
cine and do some basic tests. But if we [had] certain
things available.... we wouldn’t need the hospital’ [GP3]
In this context, respondents reported six main ambi-
tions for the project: to seek beneficial changes to peo-
ple’s health, help patients to take greater control, change
how services are used, secure greater self-management
and management in primary care, deliver strategic
thinking on whole system redesign, and to make savings.
The chief executive from the PCT put it like this:
‘What we wanted to see was the evidence, captured else-
where, of how changing the way that care is delivered can
result in some really beneficial changes to patients’ health,
on the one hand, but also change the way that patients
used healthcare facilities. So, we were working with [name
of private sector provider] to look at the changes to health
for people with long term conditions when they were given
support in a different way.... And in particular, we were
looking at morbidity, [reductions in the] number of hospi-
tal admissions that might result from people being able to
self-manage themselves in a more effective way. But also
being able to receive that support primarily from primary
care rather than actually to have to go into hospital.....
[and] I guess we saw the project and investment we put in
has potential to lead into longer term savings because, of
course, with PBR we’re paying for every time that people
with long term conditions enter into a hospital environ-
ment, and we knew, of course, all the evidence shows us is
that people with long term conditions are those that
occupy the majority of hospital beds....’ [PCT CE]
There was not absolute consensus. One GP [GP2] was
doubtful that the telephone care management service
would diminish A & E attendances although it might
reduce hospital admissions. Another GP [GP3] thought it
would help with improving patient understanding of their
long term condition, modify lifestyle behaviours affecting
their health as well as halting the ‘disease process’, reducing
hospital admissions, and lengths of stay. Related ambitions
were to change perceptions in the minds of patients about
long term conditions having a wholly external locus of
control, to challenge folklore about the need for A & E
attendance to provide confirmation of the severity of the
health problem, and to tackle some of the mental health
issues that often go along with having more than one long
term condition. A powerful image was conjured by one
respondent in describing the importance of giving ‘arm-
bands’ to the ‘weak swimmers’ - which is what the tele-
phone support service has done.
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Although the foreseen effect was to reduce use of sec-
ondary care services, the point was made that the primary
aim of the project was to improve care for patients.
Roles and relationships
Four aspects to roles and relationships came through
strongly in the interviews. First, the primacy of the prac-
tices, and in particular the GPs, in driving the service
redesign project; second, the close relationship with the
private sector provider; third, the spirit of co-design and
co-production with the private provider; and, fourth, the
history of a positive relationship developed with the Pri-
mary Care Trust (PCT) the local body responsible for
healthcare commissioning at the time of the study.
One of the reported characteristics of this project was
that the level of commissioning was spearheaded at the
practice level rather than at the PCT. This meant own-
ership was at that level rather than the PCT ‘selling’ the
initiative. Our participants indicated that the project was
led, in the main, by the doctors rather than by nurses or
other staff from the practices. It was doctors who
decided who should be excluded from invitations to par-
ticipate in the service (for example because a patient
had a terminal illness). Nurse practitioners and practice
nurses attended briefing sessions and were involved in
the development of the group consultation service. Of
the primary health care team, community nurses from
the local NHS community service organisation run by
the primary care trust probably had least exposure to
the project. There was also no evidence that the local
hospital were involved in the design. Practice managers
were involved in liaising with the private sector partner
particularly around access to patient records. There was
at least one example of ideas from the practice staff
however that had not appeared to have percolated up
either to the practice or further. Patient group members
were invited to quarterly forums and gave views on the
text of letters to be sent to patients and on survey
questionnaires.
One example of collaboration was the very close co-
design of the telephonic care management service with
the private sector partner. After the risk stratification
tool had been utilised, GPs in all 5 practices checked
their lists of patients for suitability for invitation to tele-
phone support service. As the private provider lead said:
‘To us it’s just patients on a list. We don’t know who’s
hard of hearing, who has compliance issues, who is even
possibly in day care during the day, so we do rely on
them really being able to go through that list at a high
level and just being able to say: look this person’s really
not appropriate. And sometimes our risk model will miss
patients that really could benefit, so if they do come
across somebody that they think would be perfect for the
programme we can invite them into the programme and
get their data. So I think their [GP] involvement there
has been really instrumental in that initial patient deter-
mination’ [PPL].
The private sector partner had been initially brought
in at the first phase of the Livewell initiative in a strate-
gic partnership, without a formal tender: ‘an agreement
in principle that we wanted to work together’ [BM].
They were engaged for their expertise and fresh out-
look to offer overall programme management support,
provide the in-depth practice profiles on activity and
costs, be the clinical lead on the telephonic care man-
agement service, and to be partners in strategic thinking
on whole system redesign (the ‘think-tank’ work). The
private sector partner was described by respondents as
prepared, organised, interested, patient and responsive:
‘The [Private sector partner] were the only ones who
wanted to work with little people like us and develop a
product’ [GP4].
The overall relationship was described as close, with a
strong rapport, working as one team, learning together
and a desire for a win-win between both parties.
Latterly, with the advent of the second phase of the
Livewell initiative, which was a single action tender and
recognising that both parties owned some intellectual
property, a more transactional tone was reported to be
coming to the fore at times with more of a focus on
KPIs (key performance indicators). The second genera-
tion practices reported a courteous but more distant
relationship with the commissioning support firm, indi-
cating in their interviews that the first phase of the pro-
ject had done much of the trialling and they had been
able to take advantage of that.
On the whole, the spirit of co-design, co-production
and learning together came through very strongly. A
trial and error approach was adopted as it was agreed
that a US model without adaptations to suit the multi-
cultural local population in this inner city area in Eng-
land would not work. For example, not only was the
initial determination of the choice of patients to receive
the telephone support service co-delivered in collabora-
tion with the practices, but the system for feedback and
referral back to practices of patients by the telephone
care management nurses was also redesigned, following
some difficulties with conveying uncorroborated patient
viewpoints about perceived deficiencies in GP surgery
services. One respondent, in relation to his/her role as a
GP commissioner, commented favourably on being able
to work with a healthcare provider ‘from the inside’ and
a preparedness on the part of the private sector provider
‘to work with the little people’ in contrast with the more
distant relationships experienced with providers in nor-
mal circumstances.
There was a history over some years of the general
medical practices developing positive relationships with
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the PCT. More than one respondent described humor-
ously how the PCT had been ‘drip tortured’ into invest-
ing in the initiative. Unusually, the PCT (by the
admission of the PCT chief executive as well as other
respondents) encouraged and supported, rather than
commissioned this project. But the investment was not
easily won and required tenacity:
‘It’s....about creating some of those relationships and
the relationship building...... Sometimes I don’t agree
with what people say and you don’t agree with their
mode of working, you just have to stick with it. It
requires staying power. And also for them to know
that you are, we are the organisational memory here,
I’ve been round so many times’ [GP4]
Impact, adoption and spread of innovation
In terms of evidence, respondents indicated that, for the
time being, the positive impact in the Livewell pro-
gramme was largely experienced by very positive patient
feedback from the telephonic care management service
rather than from statistical evidence about a decrease in
A & E attendances and admissions. There are plans in
place to report to practices changes to biometrics of
affected patients, such as blood pressure, levels of blood
sugar, weight, breathlessness and so on, recognising that
changes are likely to take at least a year before they are
seen.
Second phase practices acknowledged that much of
the hard work had been done in the first phase and that
although they had not been involved from the begin-
ning, they benefitted from that. They gave the impres-
sion of being more casual in their motives for joining
the project. One also reported that having been invited
to join the second phase, they decided ‘why not...give it
a try’? [GP2].
Respondents reported issues with followership,
embedding innovation such as risk stratification in gen-
eral practice and the challenge of scaling up. The second
phase practices were more likely to have either the clini-
cians or the practice manager closely involved in the
project rather than both. There were some problems
expressed with practices signing up but not necessarily
wholly committed. One practice indicated that they felt
‘a little in the dark....and not near the [lead practice]
level [PM 1]. Not all were convinced of the value of
group consultations. In parallel with this, those consid-
ered to be the innovators or entrepreneurs also reported
experiencing a degree of mistrust at times from their
wider peer group.
On the other hand, the involvement of a wider group
of practices had tested the project conception and
design, and resulted for example in the programme
embracing the challenge of managing the psychological
aspects of long term physical health conditions. One of
the practices reported the wider use within the PCT of
the idea of the telephone care management service to
ring their very elderly patients during the winter period
to check that they were ok. Another example was the
potential use of the practice profiles developed by the
private sector partner to probe cost and value of obste-
trics services (particularly for pre term monitoring
admissions) and the possibility of primary care based
fracture reviews.
Destabilisation: the impact of changes in commissioning
arrangements
The influences of health reform were felt in three
respects. First, there was an acknowledgement of the
changing health policy and political context and not
least a change of government and the consequences of
this for the private sector partner, as the market for pri-
vate providers had shifted. Second, it was noted that the
project was an invest-to-save project that crossed
between the old and new NHS commissioning regimes.
This meant that there was some rupture in long term
relationships, the new commissioning architecture was
complex, Third, PCT staff were leaving so that data
extraction process had been delayed by up to nine
months, and there was now an absence of the proactive
involvement, support and encouragement from the ori-
ginal funder.
Discussion
In this mode of commissioning, around strategic long
term partnering with a private sector commissioning sup-
port organisation and provider, we note that the three
dominant media of power were relational: first, the devel-
opment and maintenance of a negotiated order (Power
medium 1, Table 1) through agreed information sharing,
division of labour and close collaboration; second, in order
to secure funding in the first place, tenacity in an appeal
to the scientific evidence underpinning the project (Power
medium 4, Table 1) and, third, managerial performance of
the procurement process, in its widest sense, with the ser-
vice supplier being as proactive in this regard as the pro-
curer (the practices) which we can also term ‘provider-led
commissioning’ (Power medium 6, Table 1).
We were particularly interested in this notion of ‘clo-
seness’ between provider and commissioner – terms
themselves not used by the participants to describe
themselves, preferring the term ‘partner’. There is here a
possibility of getting ‘too close’, that is without sufficient
challenge, or in corporate governance terms, focussing
on a joint endeavour or stewardship approach, which
itself has been found to contain that potential hazard
[27]. There may also be a contingency perspective at
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play, that is an understanding about the stage in the
commissioning or service improvement cycle when this
was entirely appropriate to achieve the objectives of
both parties and in particular when this a new kind of
initiative for both parties. We have considered also
whether this closeness was indicative of more widely
found behaviours of service providers from the private
sector with their customers or clients, in contrast to
providers in the public sector who may more generally
keep their distance from the commissioners. Cousins and
Spekman describe a climate of change in private sector
supply chain management thinking, which would endorse
this, signalling a move away from arms-length relation-
ships towards a mutual obligation-based approach
between suppliers and purchasers [5].
We noted that additional media of power were added
to the commissioning repertoire, on occasion, for exam-
ple contract enforcement (power medium 5, Table 1)
through the use of the monitoring of adherence to key
performance indicators, and as well as appeal to scienti-
fic evidence, the use of ideological control (power med-
ium 4, Table 1) through the foregrounding and espousal
of preferred policies such as integrated care and risk
stratification for active case management.
From a governance perspective, we noted the domi-
nance of a spirit of high trust and close professional align-
ment between the parties to achieve the negotiated order,
which tends to support the stewardship theory of the joint
endeavour, as opposed to the agency theory predicated on
the two parties having different sets of interests and there-
fore low trust (see Table 2). In the project set-up phase,
we also noted the significance of boundary spanning to
leverage external influence and resource which mirrors
the resource dependency corporate governance theory.
The term ‘drip torture’ was used (by themselves) to
describe the tenacity with which the leadership of the pro-
gramme sought financial support, courteously stalking the
PCT over a sustained period until their request was
acceded to.
Some further preliminary conclusions can be drawn
from this study, to be tested and refined with follow-up
phone calls with participants, with their permission. The
first one is in relation to the practice of micro-commis-
sioning which provides a particular insight into the
managerial performance of procurement (power med-
ium 6) in the healthcare context. As a preliminary, the
general practice participants were averse to the term
commissioning itself, with service redesign or a new offer
being preferred terminology. One of the most striking
observations of this project is the closeness of the two
parties in service design and development and the
acknowledgement that this is a lengthy, uncertain, itera-
tive and labour intensive process to gain traction, own-
ership, change and measurable impact. Provider-led
commissioning was also permitted: where the commis-
sioning support firm had very specific expertise and
experience in service design and provision (for example
in analytics and in the development of the telephonic
care management service), the commissioner (the GPs)
let them lead on the design of those services.
Primary care clinicians described themselves as ‘little
people’, more than once. This perception of relative
powerlessness in the overall healthcare system and the
measures taken to mitigate this state of affairs as
observed in this case study can aid our understanding of
effective commissioning when there are perceived signif-
icant power differentials.
Some spin-off consequences of employing a different
kind of health care provider with fresh ideas were
described. The challenge of scaling up, of embedding
innovation across 5 practices rather than within just one
practice was noted. This reflects a level of risk aversion
in the NHS and the problem of a somewhat ossified
healthcare system. It confirms a prevailing organisation
culture which is more inclined to incremental rather
than to disruptive innovation.
Practical lessons for commissioners in the English NHS
and other countries
We think that there are a number of practical lessons
for commissioners in the NHS in England and for
healthcare design, commissioning and procurement in
other countries, which relate to our original research
questions around media of power and alternative
approaches to governance:
1. There has to be an acknowledgement that the very
term ‘commissioning’ is problematic and can be a ‘turn
off’, particularly for the clinicians who may be at the
heart of the process, either as commissioners or as deli-
verers of care. It is a peculiarly English term. Alternative
more acceptable terminology could be considered and
may include: service redesign, development, improve-
ment, procurement, purchasing; with clinical commis-
sioning groups becoming the ‘design house’.
2. The case study has shown the benefits of a mode of
commissioning characterised by closeness (‘deep commis-
sioning’ or ‘micro commissioning’) between commis-
sioners and providers in service development, recognising
the often tortuous path to securing actual improvements
for patients. This closeness to commissioners is something
that providers too may wish to consider. We do not see
this as being necessarily a characteristic of working with a
private provider of health care or with commissioning sup-
port services. It may however be that in this case the pri-
vate provider was more innately customer focussed than
public sector providers might be. There are also to suspect
that the closeness is connected with the nature of complex
long-term care and common, undifferentiated complex
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conditions, for example multi-morbidity in frail elderly
often with social marginalisation reasons (see the papers
by Porter et al [36], and Sheaff et al [6] in this special
issue). We do not yet know what measurable benefits have
been achieved by this programme for patients but the high
levels of trust and the degree of embeddedness of provider
with commissioner stands out and points to a very pro-
ductive mode of commissioning. More research in this
area to understand the circumstances when this approach
would be particularly beneficial is called for.
3. The research study is predicated on the existence of
a media of power commissioning repertoire, which
makes use, alternately, of relational approaches, con-
tracting levers, markets and competition, ideological dis-
ciplines, financial incentives and robust management of
procurement. The project under investigation favoured
the first, particularly in the start-up phase, enhancing a
creative spirit of joint enterprise. Commissioners may
wish to consider selecting more deliberately which
approach suits particular circumstances.
4. We would suggest that the underpinning govern-
ance principles for a commissioning repertoire could be
amplified to include agency, stewardship, resource
dependency and stakeholder frames. In practice, this
means that commissioners may select, and switch
between, a low trust and high challenge approach with
providers (for example when there are concerns about
service weakness or failure), a high trust and high chal-
lenge approach for generating innovative ideas for ser-
vice improvement, or an externally focussed boundary
spanning approach (building relationships with key sta-
keholders in the system) for example to enhance reputa-
tion, win resources and inward investment.
5. Identification, support and backing for the relatively
rare radical thinkers and innovators in the NHS in Eng-
land, particularly in primary care, would be helpful to
speed up the pace of change. In parallel, these radical
innovators may wish to consider the value of relation-
ship building and the use of carefully constructed selec-
tive long term restatement of their ideas with key
stakeholders, described as ‘drip torture’ in this study, as
a mechanism for getting their views heard.
6. The consequences of structural reform on the com-
missioning side of the NHS in England may be a tempor-
ary slowing down of innovation and implementation of
service improvement due to ruptures in long term rela-
tionships in circumstances where these, given the empha-
sis on negotiated order and stewardship governance, have
begun to be productive. There are warnings here for
other countries considering embarking on structural
healthcare reform. The argument that there is currently a
misplaced focus on structural rather than service reform
in the NHS to solve efficiency and effectiveness problems
has been made elsewhere [39]. This case study offers
further evidence of this and spells out the consequences,
particularly in relation to the rate of being able to
improve services for vulnerable patients.
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